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In this essay, Rolston examines the  fact/value prob- 
lem as it applies to  nature. He argues that values are 
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objective in nature, and that just as philosophers are 
naturalizing ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics, 
they should naturalize values. 
 
In  an  age  of  naturalism,   philosophers  seem  as  yet 
unable  to   naturalize   values.  They  are   naturalizing 
ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. They have con- 
nected human ethical behavior to Darwinian  reciproc- 
ity,  kin  selection,  genetic  fitness,  and  so  on.  They 
analyze human capacities for epistemology with care to 
notice how our  human  perceptions, our  sense organs, 
have an evolutionary history. Our  mind and its cogni- 
tive capacities are pragmatic ways of functioning in the 
world.  They  interpret   ideologies  and   metaphysical 
views  as  means  of  coping,  worldviews  that  enable 
humans in their societies to cohere and  to outcompete 
other  societies. Ethics, epistemology, and  metaphysics 
are survival tools, whatever else they may also become. 
But philosophers are slow to naturalize axiology.  If 
they do, they try to demonstrate the biological roots of 
human values. They show that  our values root  in our 
biological needs—for food, shelter, security, resources, 
self-defense, offspring, stability, and status in our soci- 
eties. Beyond that, philosophers do not naturalize values 
in any deeper sense. They cannot disconnect nature from 
humans so that  anything else in nature  can have any 
intrinsic value on its own. That is disconcerting. Nature 
comes to have value only when humans take it up into 
their experience. This, they may think, is a naturalized 
account of value; but, I shall argue here, such analysis 
has not yet come within reach of a biologically based 
account of values. Somewhat curiously, the more obvi- 
ous kind of naturalizing—showing that  our values are 
framed by our evolutionary embodiment in the world— 
blinds us to the deeper kind of naturalizing—recogniz- 
ing an  evolutionary  world  in  which  values, some of 
which we. share, are pervasively embodied in the nonhu- 
man world. 
The debate is complex and multi-leveled. We touch 
the nerve of it here by focusing on value as this is pres- 
ent in living organisms and their species lines. Let's start 
by looking over the shoulders of some recent scientists 
and their discoveries. 
 
 
1. Dragonflies, Leaf Stomata, 
Bacterial Clocks, and Genomes 
 
Studies of dragonflies in the Carboniferous  show that 
their wings "are proving to be spectacular examples of 
microengineering"  giving  them   "the   agile,  versatile 
flight necessary to catch prey in flight." They are 
"adapted  for high-performance flight" (Wootton et al., 
1998).  "To  execute  these  aerobatic   maneuvers,  the 
insects come  equipped  with  highly engineered  wings 
that automatically change their flight shape in response 
to airflow,  putting the designers of the latest jet fighters 
to shame"  (Vogel, 1998). Dragonflies have to change 
their wing shape in flight without benefit of muscles (as 
in birds and bats), so they use a flexible aerofoil with 
veins that  enables the wing surface  to twist in direct 
response to aerodynamic loading when suddenly chang- 
ing directions or shifting from upstroke to downstroke. 
A hind-wing base mechanism is especially impressive in 
the way it mixes flexibility and  rigidity. "The 'smart' 
wing-base mechanism is best interpreted as an elegant 
means of maintaining downstroke efficiency in the pres- 
ence of these adaptations  to improve upstroke useful- 
ness" (Wootton et al., 1998). 
 Botanists report studies in what they call "a plant's 
dilemma."   Plants  need  to  photosynthesize  to  gain 
energy from the sun,   which requires access to carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. They also need to conserve 
water, vital to their metabolism, and access to atmos- 
phere which evaporates  water. This forces a trade-off 
in leaves between too much and too little exposure  to 
atmosphere. The problem is solved by stomata on the 
undersides of leaves, which can open and close, letting 
in or shutting  out  the air. "The stomatal  aperture  is 
controlled  by osmotic  adjustment  in the surrounding 
cells. In a sophisticated  regulatory  mechanism, light, 
the carbon  dioxide  required  for  photosynthesis, and 
the water status of the plant are integrated to regulate 
stomatal   aperture   for   optimization  of  the  plant's 
growth  and  performance" (Grill and  Ziegler, 1998). 
The details of such "plant  strategies" vary in different 
species  but  are  quite  complex,  integrating  multiple 
environmental  and  metabolic  variables—water  avail- 
ability, drought,  heat, cold, sunlight, water stress, and 
energy needs in the plant—sophisticated solutions to the 
plant's dilemma. 
Even the cyanobacteria,  blue-green algae, which are 
relatively primitive single-celled organisms, can  track 
day and night with molecular clocks built with a genetic 
oscillator rather similar to those in more advanced 
organisms. Discovering this, Marcia Barinaga says. 
"Keeping track of day-night cycles is apparently so 
essential, perhaps because it helps organisms prepare for 
the special physiological needs they will have at various 
times during the daily cycle, that clocks seem to have 
arisen multiple times, recreating the same design each 
time" (1998). 
Reporting a June 1998 conference on "Molecular 
Strategies in Evolution," geneticists have found so many 
examples of "how  the genome readies itself for evolu- 
tion" that they are making a "paradigm shift." 
Abandoning the idea that genetic mutation  is entirely 
blind and  random,  and  that  genetic errors  are sup- 
pressed to minimize change, geneticists are impressed 
with the innovative, creative capacities in the genome. 
These "new findings are persuading them that the most 
successful genomes may be those that have evolved to be 
able to change quickly and substantially if  necessary" 
(Pennisi, 1998). Genes do this by using transposons— 
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gene  segments,  mobile  elements—that  they  can  use 
rapidly to alter DNA and the resulting protein structures 
and  metabolisms in time of stress. "Chance favors the 
prepared  genome," says Lynn Caporale, a  biotechnol- 
ogy geneticist. James Shapiro, a  bacterial geneticist at 
the University of Chicago, comments: "The capability of 
cells  has  gone  far  beyond  what  we  had  imagined." 
"Cells engineer their own genomes" (quoted in Pennisi, 
1998). 
The genome in vertebrates, for example, has evolved 
quite   successful  capacities  to  resist  diseases. 
Transposons turn out to be especially useful in the 
acquired immune system, which is not present in inver- 
tebrates,  but which was discovered and elaborated  in 
vertebrates. "The immune system is a wonderful exam- 
ple of how a mobile piece of DNA can have an astound- 
ing impact on evolution," says David Schatz of Yale 
University (quoted in Pennisi, 1998). Innate immunity, 
which is present in vertebrates, is coded in the genes and 
"remembers" what has happened in the organism's evo-. 
lutionary   past.  But acquired  immunity  "remembers" 
what  has come along during the organism's  biographi- 
cal  past. An organism gets the disease; then its  body 
remembers, forms antigens, and does not get the disease 
a second time. 
One has to use language with care; we should guard 
against overly cognitive language. But scientists do have 
to  describe what is going on; and  there is a  kind  of 
acquired  learning in immunity, mechanical though  the 
system  also  is. Immunologists  use a  term  here  that 
philosophers will find revealing. When stem cells from 
the bone marrow mature in the thymus (T cells), this is 
called "thymic education"  (Abbas et al., 1991, p. 169). 
Once such an educated T cell meets an alien microbe, it . 
not  only triggers defenses, it triggers a memory. What 
immunologists call "memory cells" are made; these are 
both   long-lived  and   reproduce   themselves, so  that 
acquired immunity can continue for decades, even a life- 
time. The body can remember what sorts of organisms 
it has met before and be ready for their return. From a 
philosophical  perspective, we may wish to  be circum- 
spect about  "memory" cells, as we are about "remem- 
bering"; and yet the vocabulary is widespread in 
immunology and seems equally legitimate, say, to  the 
use of "memory" in computer science. Additionally, in 
organisms—as it is not in computers—this is vital to 
life. Such capacity is much smarter  than mere genetics; 
the body has defensive capacities far in excess of 
anything that could have been coded for in the genes. 
The immune system has a complex task. A host of 
metabolically and structurally different cells have to be 
choreographed  in organic unity. Further, invader cells, 
myriads of kinds of them, and insider cells gone wrong 
in many different ways—all these must be seen and elim- 
inated. This has to be done at microscopic and molecu- 
lar ranges with careful regulation, which involves 
complement  molecules that  work  in  a   cascade  reac- 
tion—15-20  different   molecules,  and   10  or  more 
inhibitors, a total of some 30-40 molecules.  Such a cas- 
cade might seem overly complex, but it is really a sophis- 
ticated  form  of  regulation;  there  are  amplification 
circuits and stabilizing loops, shut-down provisions and 
backup pathways. This is, of course, a causal system, 
but it is more  than  that;  the system is protecting an 
organismic self.  
Complement can  be quite destructive and  that is a 
good thing when it provides immunity for the organism, 
but it is also a bad thing if it goes out of control. So com- 
plement requires tight, fail-safe regulation. Immunolo- 
ogists use here the language of a fine-tuned mechanism: 
"Because of these regulatory mechanisms, a delicate bal- 
ance of activation and inhibition of the complement cas- 
cades is achieved which prevents damage to autologous 
[self] cells and tissues but promotes the effective destruc- 
tion of foreign organisms" (Abbas et al., 1991, p. 268). 
"The consequences of complement activation are so sig- 
nificant and potentially dangerous that the system must 
be very carefully  regulated"  (Tizard,  1992,  p. 200). 
Some threats and achievements here seem to be "signif- 
icant,"   "dangerous,"  "effective,"   and   "damaging"; 
something vital is at stake. 
Can you see that philosophers, looking over the 
shoulders of these scientists with  their descriptions  of 
what is going on, have some value questions to ask? The 
immune system is a sophisticated means of preserving 
biological identity at a high level of idiographic organis- 
mic diversity. All this is going on spontaneously, 
autonomously,  without  any  animal  awareness, much 
less any humans thinking about it. 
There is praise for those dragonfly wings in the 
Carboniferous, coming from the scientists who study 
them.  What is a philosopher to say?   "Well, those are 
interesting wings to the scientists who study them, but 
they were of no value to the dragonflies." That  seems 
implausible. Perhaps  one  can  go  part  way  and  say: 
"Well,  those  wings did  have value  to  the individual 
dragonflies who owned them. Instrumentally, the drag- 
onflies found them useful. But a dragonfly is incapable of 
intrinsically valuing anything. Much  less do  these, 
wings represent anything of value to  the species line. 
Similar engineering features  persist,  Wootton  and  his 
associates add,  in  present-day  dragonflies, living 320 
million years later than the fossil dragonflies they stud- 
ied in Argentina. That  does sound  like something that 
has been useful for quite a long time. Could that be of 
value to the species line? 
The repeated discovery of molecular docks  in those 
cyanobacteria is important  in fulfilling the organisms' 
"needs," and that seems pretty much fact of the matter. 
After that, do we want to insist that nevertheless this has no 
"value" to these organisms or their species lines, who have 
several times discovered how these internal docks, 
similarly "designed," increase their adapted fit? 
Studying those immune systems,  a cell biologist finds 
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something "wonderful." But, you will insist, this is only 
"wonderful"  when cell biologists get there  to wonder 
about it. Perhaps nothing is "astounding" until a human 
being comes around to be astounded. We do not think 
that the genomes are astounded. Still, the biological 
achievements are there long before we get let in on them. 
Set aside the wonder. In the objective facts—leaf stom- ata, 
genome evolution,  bacterial clocks—is there any- 
thing there of value? 
 
 
2. Anthropic Valuers and Their Values 
 
Most philosophers insist there is not. Values in nature 
are always "anthropocentric," human-centered, or at 
least "anthropogenic" (generated by humans). Bryan G. 
Norton  concludes: "Moralists  among environmental 
ethicists    have erred  in  looking  for  a  value  in  living 
  things that is independent of human valuing.  They have 
therefore forgotten a most elementary point about valu- 
ing anything.  Valuing always occurs from the viewpoint 
of a conscious valuer.... Only the humans are valuing 
agents" (1991, p. 251).  Norton,  of course,  believes in 
an  objective  world  that   he  is  anxious  to  conserve. 
Walking  along  a  beach, he values, for  example, the 
sand dollars (Mellita quinquiesperforata) he finds there. 
He has respect for  life (1991,  pp. 3-13). He chose a 
sand dollar to picture on the cover of his book. Such 
encounters  make  him  a  better  person,  give him an 
enlarged sense of his place in the world, and increase his 
wonder over the world he lives in. So he celebrates "the 
character-building  transformative  value of interactions 
with nature:" (1987, pp. 10-11). He gets a lot of good 
out of respecting sand dollars. 
But  Norton   does   not   want  any  epistemological 
"foundationalism" or "metaphysical realism,'" as 
though  humans  (whether  scientists  or  philosophers) 
could actually know anything out there in nature inde- 
pendently of ourselves, much less that there are values 
intrinsic  to  some  of  these  nonhuman  organisms out 
there. There is no getting out of our epistemological 
bondage, no getting past "interactions";  it is naive for 
humans to claim to know objective value in sand dol- 
lars. Norton regrets that I, when I claim to know more 
than "interactions,"  have fallen into the "devastating 
legacy" of "outmoded" Cartesian dualism, "a  bewitch- 
ment of ossified language" (1992, pp. 216-218, p. 224). 
J. Baird Callicott,  equally zealous for the conservation 
of nature,  is equally clear about our unique human value- 
ability. All intrinsic value attached to nature is "grounded 
in human feelings" but is "projected" onto  the natural 
object that "excites" the value. "Intrinsic value ultimately 
depends upon human valuers." "Value depends upon 
human sentiments" (1984, p. 305). We humans can and 
ought  place such value on natural things, at times, but 
there is no value already in place before we come.  Intrinsic 
value is our construct, interactively with nature,  but not 
something discovered which was there before we came. 
"There can be no value apart from an evaluator, ... all 
value is as it were in the eye of the beholder [and] ... 
therefore, is humanly dependent"  (1989, p. 26). Such 
value is "anthropogenic" (1992, p. 132). 
 
The source of all value is human  consciousness, but it by 
no means follows that  the locus of all value is conscious- 
ness itself.... An intrinsically  valuable thing on this 
reading is valuable  for its own sake,  for itself, but it is 
not valuable in itself, that  is, completely  independently of 
any consciousness,  since no value can, in principle, ... be 
altogether  independent of a valuing consciousness. ... 
Value is, as it were, projected onto  natural  objects or 
events by the subjective feelings of observers.  If  all con- 
sciousness were annihilated at a stroke, there would be 
no good and evil, no beauty and  ugliness, no right and 
wrong; only impassive phenomena would  remain. (1989, 
pp. 133-134, 147) 
 
What that means, of course, is that the dragonfly wings 
were no "good" to them, or at least of no. "value" to 
them. Though insects, sand dollars, bacteria, and plants 
may engineer their own genomes, there is nothing valu- 
able about  any of these activities, much less right or 
beautiful. Take our evaluating consciousness away,  and 
there remain only impassive phenomena. 
These  philosophers  have  to  conclude  so  because 
according to classical value theory only humans produce 
value; wild nature is intrinsically valueless. That seems 
to be a metaphysical claim in Callicott. We can know 
what is there without us: impassive phenomena; we can 
know what  is not  there: intrinsic value. Or if not so 
ontological this is at least an epistemological claim, as 
with Norton: we are unable to know what is there with- 
out us. All we can know is that some things in nature, 
before we get there, have the potential to be evaluated 
by humans. We know  this because if and  when  we 
humans appear. we may incline, sometimes, to value 
nature  in noninstrumental  ways, as when we . project 
intrinsic value onto sequoia trees while hiking through 
the forest, or have transformative experiences encoun- 
tering sand dollars on a beach. 
The best we can do is to give a dispositional twist to 
value. To say that  n  is valuable means that  n  (some 
object in nature) is able to be valued, if and when human 
valuers, H's  (some Humans), come along, although  n 
has these properties whether or not humans arrive. The 
object plays its necessary part,  though this is not suffi- 
cient without the subject. Nature contains "a range of 
potential values in nature actualizable upon interaction 
with consciousness" (Callicott, 1992,  p. 129). By this 
account there is no actual value ownership autonomous 
to the dragonflies, bacteria, plants, or genome lines— 
none at  least that we can know  about. When cellular 
biologists  arrive  with  their  wonder  and  resolve to 
admire and perhaps also to conserve these things, there 
is value ignition. Intrinsic  value in the  realized sense 
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emerges relationally with the appearance of the subject- 
generator. This is something like opening the door of a 
refrigerator, when things previously in the dark light up. 
But  axiologically  speaking,  nature  is  always  in  the 
dark—unless and until humans come. 
Perhaps you can begin to see why I am disconcerted 
that philosophers can be so naturalistic one moment and 
so separatist the next. Naturalists wish to claim that we 
humans are not metaphysically different from the rest of 
nature, whether in substance or process. Human activi- 
ties  and   those  in  wild  nature  are  equally  natural. 
Humans are completely natural in their physiologies and 
in their evolutionary histories. We are a part of nature 
and not apart from nature. Still, they still practice value 
apartheid. They resolutely find humans quite axiologi- 
cally different, with this unique valuing capacity. That 
does set us apart  f r o m  the rest of nature. 
  At the same time that  they set  us humans apart so 
surely, they may also find us so epistemologically igno- 
rant that we cannot really know what we might share 
with the nonhuman lives we encounter. In these values 
that arise when we interact with nature we are unable  to 
discover anything  more  than  these  values that  arise 
within us,  based on some potential nature has for us. But 
humans are sealed off from  making any further claims 
about the objective world. This too is value apartheid. 
The anthropogenic view values nature only in associ- 
ation with human participation. This leaves us with an 
uneasy concern that, however generously we may come 
to care for some nonhuman  others, since it is only we 
who can place value anywhere, since it is only our own 
values that  we can attend  to .or know about,  humans 
really do remain at the center of concern. Their concern 
is central to having any value at all. Their concern is all 
that matters, and it is not always going to be easy to get 
up concern for animals, plants, species, or ecosystems 
that really don't matter in themselves,   not at least so far 
as anybody knows. 
We are likely to be concerned only if they matter to 
and for us, and that is going to place humans right back 
at the center.  Nature is actually valuable only when it 
pleases us, as well as serves us. That seems to be the ulti- 
mate truth, even though we penultimately have placed 
intrinsic value on nature, and take our pleasure enjoying 
these natural things for what they are in themselves. 
Without us there is no such pleasure taken in anything. 
What  is  value-able, able  to  value  things, is  people; 
nature is able to be valued only if there are such able 
people there to do such valuing. Nature is not  value- 
able able—to generate values--on its own, nor do plants 
and animals have any such value-ability. 
 
 
3. Sentient Valuers and Their Values 
 
Peter Singer offers a more expansive account. It is not 
just humans but the higher animals that can value. We 
have to move from an anthropocentric  to a "sentiocen- 
tric" view. Or, better, hom an anthropogenic to a "sen- 
tiogenic"  view.  (Please  pardon   the  nonce  words). 
Animals can  value on  their  own,  provided  that  they 
have preferences that can  be satisfied or frustrated. A 
mother free-tailed bat, a mammal like ourselves, can, 
using sonar,  wend  her way out  of Bracken Cave, in 
Texas, in total darkness, catch SOQ-1000 insects each 
hour on the wing, and return to find and nurse her own 
young. That  gives evidence of bat-valuing; she values 
the insects and the pup. 
Now, it seems absurd to say that there are no valuers 
until humans arrive. There is no better evidence of non- 
human values and valuers than spontaneous wildlife, 
born free and on its own. Animals hunt and howl; find 
shelter; seek out their habitats and mates; care for their 
young; flee hom  threats; grow  hungry,  thirsty,  hot, 
tired, excited, sleepy. They suffer injury and lick  their 
wounds. Here we are quite convinced that value is 
nonanthropogenic,: to say nothing of anthropocentric. 
These wild animals defend thefr own  lives because 
they have a good of their own.There is somebody there 
behind the fur or feathers. Our gaze is returned  by an 
animal that itself has a concerned oudook. Here is value 
right before our eyes, right behind those eyes. Animals 
are valueable, able to value things in their world. But we 
may still want to say that value exists only where a sub- 
ject has an object of interest. Callicott modifies his posi- 
tion and says that value is not always "anthropogenic"; 
it may sometimes be "vertebragenic, since nonhuman 
animals, all vertebrates at the very least, are conscious 
and  therefore may be said, in the widest sense of the 
term, to value things" (1992, pp. 132, 138).1 
Well, that's a help, since at least the fellow vertebrates 
share in our ability to value things. They value things 
instrumentally, no doubt, since they seek other animals, 
plants, and insects for food. They value water to drink, 
dens for shelter, and so on. 
Do they value anything intrinsically? Callicott does 
not address this question,  but perhaps  he would say 
(and I would agree) that a vertebrate animal values its 
own  life intrinsically. The  deer  defends  its  life as' a 
good of its own. Such life is valued without further 
contributory  reference, even if wolves in turn make use 
of deer for food. Perhaps the mother wolf can value her 
young intrinsically, since she puts herself at risk to bear 
young. Perhaps, unawares, she values the ongoing 
species line.                                                                  . 
Nevertheless, for both Singer and Callicott, when we 
run out  of psychological experience, value is over. 
Callicott's  vertebragenic value still leaves most of the 
world valueless, since the vertebrates are only about 4 
percent of the described species. Indeed, since the num- 
bers of individuals in vertebrate species is typically much 
lower than the numbers of individuals in invertebrate or 
plant species, real valuers form  only some minuscule 
fraction of the living organisms on Earth. Nearly every- 
 
thing on Earth is still quite valueless, unless and  until 
these humans come along and place intrinsic value there. 
As Callicott insists, until humans do this, "there simply 
is no inherent   or  intrinsic value in nature"  (1989,  p. 
160). Singer is more generous than Callicott to the inver- 
tebrates. Still he claims that we must stop "somewhere 
between a shrimp and an oyster" (1990, p.174). Beyond 
that,  he  insists, "there  is  nothing  to  be  taken  into 
account" (1990, p. 8). With Singer, too, most of the bio- 
logical world has yet to be taken into account. 
Moving  any  further  is impossible on  a  sentience- 
based theory. Value, like a tickle or remorse, must be felt 
to be there. Its esse is percipi.  Nonsensed value is non- 
sense.  Only beings with "insides" to them have value. 
There is no unexperienced value, no value without  an 
experiencing valuer. According to the classical para- 
digm, so long dominant that to Norton and Callicott it 
seems elementary, there is no value without  an experi- 
encing valuer, just as there are no thoughts  without. a 
thinker,  no percepts without a perceiver, no deeds with- 
out a doer, no targets without an aimer. Valuing is felt 
preferring by human choosers. Extending this paradigm, 
sentient animals may also value. Nothing else. 
But the problem with the  "no value without a valuer" 
axiom is that it is too subjectivist;   it looks for some cen- 
ter of value located in a subjective self. And we nowhere 
wish to deny that such valuers are sufficient for value. 
But that is not the whole account of value. Perhaps there 
can be no doing science without a scientist, no religion 
without a believer, no tickle without somebody tickled. 
But there can be law without a lawgiver, history without 
a  historian; there is biology without  biologists, physics 
without  physicists, creativity without creators, achieve- 
ment without  conscious achievers—and  value without 
experiencing valuers. 
A sentient valuer is not necessary for value.   Another 
way is for there to be a value-generating system able to 
generate value, such as a plant or a genome. If you like, 
that is another meaning of value-er; any x is a valuer if 
x is value-able, able to produce values. 
No, comes the protest, naturalizing value has to be 
kept close in to our human embodiment. We simply do 
not have the cognitive capacities to know all this about 
other valuers out there. Metaphysics, epistemology, and 
ethics can and ought to be naturalized, but that does not 
mean there are any metaphysicians, epistemologists, or 
ethicists  among  the  dragonflies,  the  bacteria,  or  the 
plants; we only mean that when humans do these activ- 
ities, they do so using their naturally evolved capacities. 
Similarly with axiology, which can and ought to be nat- 
uralized, that is interpreted in terms of our naturally 
evolved capacities. But there are no philosophical axiol- 
ogists in wild nature, any more than there are meta- 
physicians, epistemologists, or ethicists. 
Maybe  we can extend  feelings into  the higher ani- 
mals, because evolution does teach their kinship with us. 
So vertebragenic axiology is a possibility. We can and 
ought to defer to animals who are close enough kin to 
us to share some of our cognitive and perceptual abili- 
ties. Beyond that, value is over. 
Social philosophers are likely to be quite sure about 
this, and quite uncomfortable with the idea of natural 
values  apart  from  human   persons  in  their  society. 
Milton Rokeach defines a value this way: "I consider a 
value to be a type of belief, centrally located within one's 
belief system, about  how  one  ought  or  ought not  to 
behave, or about some end-state of existence worth or 
not worth obtaining... These belief systems are culturally 
constructed   and   transmitted;  they   are   personally 
endorsed, enjoyed, and  critiqued.  Values have to  be 
thought about, chosen from among options, persistently 
held, and to satisfy felt preferences (Rokeach, 1968, p. 
124). If so, ipso facto, there are none in mere organisms 
which have no such capacities. So much for the dragon- 
flies and their wings, sand dollars, plants with their leaf 
stomata,  bacteria with their docks, and those genomes 
getting ready for evolution. 
 
 
4. Organisms and Their Biocentric Values 
 
Maybe the problem is that  we have let ourselves get 
imprisoned  in our  own  felt experiences. There is an 
epistemological problem,  but look at it another  way. 
We do have blinders on, psychological and philosophi- 
cal blinders, that leave us unable to detect anything but 
experientially based valuers and their felt values. So we 
are unable to accept a biologically based value account 
that is otherwise staring us in the face. Let's take 
another look  at organisms and their biocentric values, 
focusing on plants, to make sure we are not hoping for 
minimal neural experience. 
A plant is not an experiencing subject, but neither is 
it an inanimate object, like a stone. Nor is it a geomor- 
phological process, like a river. Plants are quite alive. 
Plants, like all other organisms, are self-actualizing. 
Plants are unified entities of the botanical though not of 
the zoological kind; that is, they are not unitary organ- 
isms highly integrated with centered neural control, but 
they are modular organisms, with a meristem that can 
repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative mod- 
ules, additional stem nodes, and  leaves when there is 
available space and resources, as well as new reproduc- 
tive modules, fruits, and seeds. 
Plants repair injuries and move water, nutrients, and 
photosynthate from cell to cell; they store sugars; they 
make tannin and other toxins and regulate their levels in 
defense against grazers; they  make  nectars  and  emit 
pheromones  to  influence the  behavior  of  pollinating 
insects and  the  responses of  other  plants;  they emit 
allelopathic  agents  to  suppress  invaders;  they  make 
thorns, trap insects, and so on. They can reject geneti- 
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A plant is a spontaneous, self-maintaining system, 
sustaining and reproducing itself, executing its program, 
making a way through the world, checking against per- 
formance by means of responsive capacities with which 
to measure success. Something more than merely physi- 
cal causes, even when less than sentience, is operating 
within every organism. There is information superin- 
tending the causes; without it the organism would col- 
lapse into a sand heap. The information is used to 
preserve the plant identity. This information is recorded 
in the genes, and such information,  unlike matter and 
energy, can be created and destroyed. That is what wor- 
ries environmentalists about extinction, for example. In 
such information lies the secret of life. 
Values are like color,  the  traditionalists  say. Both 
arise  in interaction. Trees are no  more valuable than 
they are green on their own. This account seems plausi- 
ble if one is asking about certain kinds of values, such as 
the fall colors we enjoy. But consider rather the infor- 
mation  that  makes photosynthesis possible. Photosyn- 
thesis is rather more objective than greenness. What is 
good for a tree (nitrogen, carbon dioxide, water) is 
observer-independent. But is not the good of the tree 
(whether it is injured or healthy) equally observer-inde- 
pendent?  The tree's  coping  based on  DNA coding is 
quite objective (even if, no doubt, there is some observer 
construction  in the theories and instruments by which 
all this is known). The sequoia tree has, after all, been 
there two thousand years, whether or not any green- 
experiencing  humans  were  around.  Sequoia semper- 
virens, the species line, has been around several million 
years, with each of its individual sequoia trees defending 
a good of their kind. 
The tree is value-able ("able-to-value")  itself. If we 
cannot  say this, then we will have to ask, as an open 
question, "Well, the tree has a good of its own, but is 
there anything of value to it?" "This tree was injured 
when the elk rubbed its velvet off its antlers, and the tan- 
nin secreted there is killing the invading bacteria. But is 
this valuable to the tree?" Botanists say that the tree is 
irritable  in  the  biological sense; it  responds with  the 
repair of injury. Such capacities can  be "vital."  These 
are observations of value in nature with just as much 
certainty as they are biological facts; that is what they 
are: facts about value relationships in nature. 
   We are really quite certain that organisms use their 
resources, and one is overinstructed in philosophy who 
denies that such resources are of value to organisms 
instrumentally. But then, why is the tree not defending its 
own life just as much fact of the matter as its use of 
nitrogen and photosynthesis to do so? 
But nothing "matters" to a tree; a plant is without 
minimally  sentient  awareness—so  Callicott,  Norton, 
and  Singer protest. By contrast,  things do matter to a 
vertebrate. True, things do not matter to trees; still, a 
great  deal matters  for them. We ask, of a failing tree, 
What's the matter with that tree?     If it is lacking sunshine 
and soil nutrients, and we arrange for these, we say, The 
tree is benefiting from them; and benefit is—everywhere 
else we encounter it—a value word. Every organism has 
a good-of-its-kind; it defends its own  kind as a good 
kind.  In this sense, the genome is a set of conservation 
molecules.  To say that the plant has a good of its own 
seems the plain fact of the matter. The flexible wings did 
"matter" to the Carboniferous  dragonflies. Being pre- 
pared for rapid evolution under stress does "matter" to 
species lines. Biologists regularly speak of the "selective 
value" or "adaptive value" of generic variations (Ayala, 
1982,  p. 88; Tamarin, 1996,  p. 558). Plant activities 
have "survival value," such as the seeds they disperse or 
the thorns they make. 
Natural selection picks out whatever traits an organ- 
ism has that are valuable to it, relative to its survival. 
When natural selection has been at work gathering these 
traits into an organism,  that organism is able to value on 
the basis of those traits. It is a valuing organism, even if 
the organism is not a sentient valuer, much less a verte- 
brate, much less a human evaluator. And those traits, 
though picked out by natural selection, are innate in the 
organism. It is difficult to dissociate the idea of value 
from natural selection. 
Any   sentigenic,   psychogenic,   vertebragenic,   or 
anthropogenic theory of value has got to argue away all 
such natural selection as not dealing with "real" value  at 
all, but mere function.  Those arguments are, in the end, 
  more likely to be stipulations than real arguments. If you 
stipulate that  valuing must  be felt valuing, that there 
must be some subject of a life, then trees are not able to 
value, their leaves and thorns are no good to them, and 
that is so by your definition.  But we wish to examine 
whether that definition, faced with the facts of biology, 
is plausible. The sentientist definition covers correctly 
but narrowly certain kinds of higher animal valuing— 
namely, that done by humans and their vertebrate rela- 
tives—and  omits all the rest. 
 
 
5. Smart Genes, Intelligent Species 
 
These organisms  are found  in species lines, and  next 
we must evaluate species lines and the genetic creativ- 
ity  that makes speciation  possible. As noticed earlier, 
contemporary  geneticists are insisting that thinking of 
this  process as   being entirely "blind"  misperceives it.2 
Genes have  substantial  solution-generating capacities. 
Though not deliberated in the conscious sense, the 
process is cognitive, somewhat  like computers, which, 
likewise without  felt experience, can run problem- 
solving programs. For these genes in organisms, much 
is vital, as nothing is in a computer. The genome, get- 
ting ready to evolve, has a vast array of sophisticated 
enzymes to cut, splice, digest, rearrange,  mutate, reit- 
erate, edit, correct, translocate, invert, and truncate 
particular gene sequences.   There is much redundancy 
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(multiple and  variant copies of a gene in multigene 
families)  that  shields the species from  accidental loss of 
a  beneficial  gene,  provides  flexibility—both  overlap- 
ping backup and  unique detail—on which  these enzymes 
can  work. 
John   H.  Campbell,  a  molecular  geneticist,  writes, 
"Cells are richly provided  with special enzymes  to tam- 
per  with  DNA  structure," enzymes  that  biologists  are 
extracting and  using  for  genetic  engineering. But  this 
"engineering" is already going on in spontaneous nature: 
 
Gene-processing enzymes also engineer comparable 
changes in genes in vivo.... We have discovered 
enzymes and enzyme pathways for almost every conceiv- 
able change in the structure of genes. The scope for self- 
engineering of multigene families seems to be limited only 
by the ingenuity of control systems for regulating these 
pathways. (1983, pp. 408-409) 
 
  These pathways may have "governors" that  are "extra- 
ordinarily  sophisticated."   "Self-governed genes   are 
'smart' machines in the current  vernacular sense. Smart 
genes suggest smart  cells and smart  evolution. It is the 
promise of radically  new genetic and evolutionary prin- 
ciples that are motivating today's study ... "  (1983, pp. 
410, 414). 
In a study of whether  species as historical  lines can be 
considered "intelligent," Jonathan Schull concludes: 
 
Plant and animal species are information-processing enti- 
ties of such complexity, integration, and adaptive compe- 
tence that it may be scientifically fruitful to consider them 
intelligent.... Plant and animal species process informa- 
tion via multiple nested  levels of variation and selection 
in a manner that is surprisingly similar to what must go 
on in intelligent animals. As biological entities, and as 
processors of information, plant and animal species are 
no less complicated than, say, monkeys. Their adaptive 
achievements (the brilliant design and exquisite produc- 
tion of biological organisms) are no less impressive, and 
certainly rival those of the animal and electronic systems 
to which the term "intelligence" is routinely (and perhaps 
validly) applied today. (1990, p. 63) 
 
Analogies with artificial intelligence in computers are 
particularly striking. Such  cognitive  processing  is not 
conscious, but  that  does not  mean  it is not  intelligent, 
where  there  are  clever  means  of problem  solving  in a 
phyletic lineage. Schull continues: 
 
Gene pools in evolving populations acquire, store, trans- 
mit, transform, and use vast amounts of fitness-relative 
information.... The information-processing capacities of 
these massively parallel distributed processing systems 
surpasses that of even the most sophisticated man-made 
systems. . .. It seems likely that an evolving species is a 
better simulation of "real" intelligence than even the best 
computer program likely to be produced by cognitive sci- 
entists for many years. (1990, pp. 64, 74) 
The result, according to David S. Thaler,  is "the  evolu- 
tion  of genetic intelligence" (1994). So it seems that if 
we recognize that  there  are smart  computers, we must 
also   recognize   that   there   are   even  smarter  genes. 
Smarter, and more vital. 
Leslie E. Orgel,  summarizing the  origin  of  life  on 
Earth, says  "Life  emerged  only  after  self-reproducing 
molecules appeared. ...   Such molecules yielded a  biol- 
ogy based on  ribonucleic  acids. The  RNA system  then 
invented proteins. As the RNA system evolved, proteins 
became the main workers  in cells, and DNA became the 
prime  repository  of genetic  information." "The  emer- 
gence of catalytic RNA was a crucial early step" (1994, 
p. 4).That is interesting,  because here is "a crucial early 
step" among Callicott's mere "impassive  phenomena." 
Not only does such problem  solving take place early 
on, and continuously thereafter, but the genes, over the 
millennia, get better at it. Past achievements are recapit- 
ulated in the present, with  variations; and these results 
get   tested   today   and   then   folded   into   the   future. 
Christopher Wills concludes 
 
There is an accumulated wisdom of the genes that actually 
 makes them better at evolving (and sometimes makes 
them better at not evolving) than were the genes of our 
distant ancestors.... This wisdom consists both of the ways 
that genes have become organized in the course of evolution 
and the ways in which the factors that change the genes 
have actually become better at their task. (1989, pp. 6-8) 
 
At least we seem to be getting  better and  better impas- 
sive phenomena. 
Donald  J. Cram,  accepting  the  Nobel  prize for  his 
work  deciphering  how  complex  and  unique  biological 
molecules recognize each other and interlock, concludes: 
"Few scientists acquainted with the chemistry of biolog- 
ical  systems  at  the  molecular   level  can  avoid   being 
inspired. Evolution  has produced  chemical compounds 
that  are exquisitely  organized  to  accomplish  the  most 
complicated  and  delicate  of  tasks."  Organic  chemists 
can hardly  "dream  of designing and synthesizing" such 
"marvels" (1988, p. 760). Marvels  they may be, but not 
until  we get  there,  Norton   must  say,  and  experience 
their "transformative value." 
Talk  of  a genetic  "strategy"  has  become common- 
place among biologists, not thereby implying conscious- 
ness, but strongly suggesting a problem-solving  skill. A 
marine snail has evolved a "strategy for rapid  immobi- 
lization of prey"and can "capture prey with remarkable 
efficiency and speed"  (Teriau et al., 1998). Well, maybe 
"strategy" is a metaphor, but what the facts that  under- 
lie the metaphor  still force is the question  whether  these 
snails "know  how"  to capture the fish they catch. And 
this is only one instance of information pervasively pres- 
ent as needed for an  organism's competence  in its eco- 
logical niche. All biology is cybernetic; the information 
storage  in DNA, the know-how for life, is the principal 
difference between biology and chemistry or physics. 
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Is a  philosopher  still going to  insist: Well, all  this 
inventiveness, strategy,  remarkable  efficiency, wisdom 
of the genes, exquisite organization to accomplish deli- 
cate  tasks, and  crucial  discoveries in evolution  to  the 
contrary, there is nothing of value here? Maybe it is time 
to face up to a crisis? 
 
 
6. An Epistemic Crisis? 
An Axiological Crisis? 
 
The cell biologists, we were saying, have been finding 
something "wonderful" in genome strategies, but it did 
seem that  this was only "wonderful" when cell biolo- 
gists got there to wonder about it. Or at least that noth- 
ing   was   "astounding"  until  a  human  being  came 
around  to be astounded. We do not think that  the 
genomes have a sense of wonder or are astounded. Still, 
the biological achievements are there long before we get 
let in on them. Facing up to these facts, which are quite 
as certain  as that  we humans are valuers in the world, 
it can seem "astounding" arrogance to say that, in our 
ignorance  of these events, before we arrived there was 
nothing of value there. 
No, my critics will reply. Rolston has not yet faced up 
to his epistemological naivete; he persists in his ontolog- 
ical realism, unaware of how contemporary philosophy 
has made any scientific knowing of any objective nature 
out  there impossible, much less any realism about  nat- 
ural  values. Rolston needs to get his Cartesian episte- 
mology and  metaphysics naturalized.   He will have to 
realize how scientists are exporting human experiences 
and overlaying nature with them when they set up these 
frameworks of understanding. We need to recognize the, 
metaphors we are projecting onto nature—not so much 
to strip them all away and see nature without metaphor, 
as to realize that all of our knowing of nature is 
metaphorical. That  will take care of his plant "dilem- 
mas,"  of  things that  "matter" to  plants,  of genome 
"engineering," and dragonfly "strategies." Whatever 
values Rolston is finding in nature are being projected 
there by these metaphors. He is not naturalizing values 
at all. 
I agree that sometimes we do  need to strip off the 
metaphors  that  scientists  may  use. When  the  comet 
Shoemaker-Levy  crashed   into  Jupiter  in  July  1994, 
astronomers  watched with interest; some of them even 
got ecstatic about the size of the explosive impact. Was 
this event of any value, or disvalue? Let us grant  that 
nothing matters to Jupiter,  nothing matters on Jupiter. 
The swirls in the planetary winds were disrupted by this 
outside  comet  crashing  in,  but  the fierce winds soon 
mixed up the debris and the flow patterns, after about a 
month,  returned  to  their  pre-impact  formations,  the 
effect of the gigantic impact fading. A headline in Science 
put  it  this  way: ..A  Giant  Licks Its Wounds"  (Kerr, 
1994). John  Hogan  in Scientific American noted that 
scientists were interested in watching "how  bruises left 
by Shoemaker-Levy disperse"  (Horgan,  1994). 
"Wounds" and "bruises" are only journalistic metaphor, 
even in science journals, when applied to Jupiter. The 
excited scientists were observing impassive phenomena. 
But what do we say when a wolf, injured in a territo- 
rial fight, licks its wounds and limps from a bruised leg? Is 
that still journalistic metaphor? Or that the elk, rub- 
bing the velvet off its anders, has "bruised" the tree, and 
that  the  tannin  is secreted  to  protect  this  "injury"? 
Hard-nosed functionalists can no doubt strip away ideas 
such as "getting ready," "being  prepared," also words 
such as "engineer" and  "information," if such words 
require conscious deliberation. But even after this strip- 
ping down, there remains something here that demands 
value language. Maybe you can sanitize the language if 
you have strong enough detergent. But you well may be 
washing out something important  that is going on. In a 
Darwinian world, where survival is ever at stake, the 
question of value has a way of dirtying up the cleanest 
humanistic value theory. 
We philosophers may protest that we know how to 
use words with precision, and  scientists can  be rather 
careless with them. That  is what  has dirtied up other- 
wise perfectly good  value theory. Though  unsophisti- 
cated biologists have used "value"  regarding plants, 
careful analysis will put  that  kind of "value"  in scare 
quotes. This so-called value is not a value, really, not 
one of interest to philosophers because it is not a value 
with interest in itself. Even if we found such interest· 
taking value, as we do in the higher animals, we humans 
would still have to evaluate any such animal values 
before we knew whether any "real" values were present. 
True, the female wolf takes an interest in the deer she 
slays and the pups she feeds. So one can say, biologically 
speaking, that she values the deer and her pups. But we 
do not yet know whether  there is any "philosophical" 
value here. There could in fact be disvalue—a big bad 
killer wolf,   rearing more such killers in the world.     Jack 
the Ripper was a good killer, good  of his kind, but a 
very bad person in the world. We humans have to eval- 
uate what  is going on  out  there,  before we can say 
whether there is any positive value there. 
Otherwise we will commit the naturalistic fallacy. We 
find what  biologically is in  nature  and  conclude that 
something valuable is there, something which we may say 
we ought to protect. Considered as normative organ- 
ismic systems organisms might have goods of their kind 
and still they might be bad kinds taken for what they are 
in themselves, or considered in the roles they play. There 
is a radical gap between finding that these organisms and 
species have goods of their kinds and in concluding, in a 
philosophical worldview, that these are good kinds. The 
gap is between finding animals and plants that have val- 
ues defended on their own, a biological description, and 
finding that these animals and plants have intrinsic value 
worthy of philosophical consideration,  which ought to 
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be  preserved.  That   latter  step  requires   philosophical 
analysis past any biological description. 
Man   is  the   measure   of  things,  said   Protagoras. 
Humans are  the measurers,  the valuers of things, even 
when   we  measure   what   they  are  in  themselves.  So 
humans  are  the only evaluators  who  can  reflect about 
what is going on at this global scale, who can deliberate 
about  what   they  ought   to  do  conserving   it.  When 
humans do this, they must set up the scales; and humans 
are the measurers of things. Animals, organisms, species, 
ecosystems, Earth cannot  teach us how to do this evalu- 
ating. Perhaps not, but still they can and do display what it 
is that is to be evaluated. The axiological scales we con- 
struct  do not constitute the value any more than the sci- 
entific scales we erect create what we thereby measure. 
What  are we evaluating? Among much else, we are 
appraising organisms  in species lines with their adaptive 
fits. In this evaluation,  we do consider our  options,   and 
 adopt attitudes toward  nature  with conscious  reflection 
(such as whether we choose and why to save endangered 
species) that may result in the values we humans choose. 
But in the biological world which we have under consid- 
eration, such capacities drop out. The plants and animals 
are not so capable. But that does not mean that value dis- 
appears, only that  it shifts to the biological level. 
     An organism  cannot survive  without  situated  envi- 
ronmental fitness. There  organisms  do  mostly  uncon-    
sciously  (and  sometimes  consciously)  defend  their  lives 
and  their kinds. Might  they be bad kinds? The cautious 
philosophical critic will say that, even though  an organ- 
ism evolves to have a situated environmental fitness, not 
all such  situations are  necessarily good  arrangements; 
some can  be clumsy or  bad.  They  could  involve  bad 
organisms in bad evolutionary patterns—perhaps  those 
efficient and  venomous  snails, destroying  those fish, or 
dragonflies so efficient in flight that they devastate  their 
prey and  upset previously stable ecosystems. Perhaps, at 
times.  But  with  rare  exceptions,  organisms   are  well 
adapted to the niches they fill, and remain so as the co- 
evolutionary process goes on. By natural  selection  their 
ecosystemic roles must mesh with the kinds of goods to 
which  they  are  genetically  programmed. At  least  we 
ought  to put the burden  of proof on a human  evaluator 
to say why any natural kind is a bad kind and ought not 
to call forth admiring respect. 
The  world  is a field of the contest of values. We can 
hardly  deny that, even if we suppose that  those are bad 
snails killing those fish, or that pest insects come along, 
eat  plant  leaves,  and  capture   the  stored   energy  that 
plants would  have otherwise  used to preserve their own 
good  kinds. When we recognize how the ecosystem is a 
perpetual contest  of goods in dialectic and exchange, it 
will become difficult  to say that  all or even any of the 
organisms  in it are bad kinds, ill-situated in their niches. 
The misfits are extinct,  or soon will be. Rather  it seems 
that  many of them, maybe even all of them, will have to 
be respected   for  the skills and  achievements   by which 
they survive over the millennia. At least we will have to 
recognize the possibility of intrinsic value in nature, and 
it will seem arrogant to retreat  into  a human-centered 
environmental ethics. This is true no matter  bow much 
the  anti-foundationalists  and   the  anti-realists  protest 
that we humans cannot know enough about what these 
animals and plants  are like in themselves to escape our 
own  blinders. 
Does it not rather  seem that  when we are describing 
what  benefits  the  dragonflies or  the snails, the plants 
with their leaf stomata, or the bacteria with their clocks, 
such value is pretty much fact of the matter,  If  we refuse 
to recognize such values as objectively there, have we 
committed  some fallacy? Rather, the danger is the other 
way  round. We  commit   the  subjectivist  fallacy if  we 
think  all values lie in subjective experience, and, worse 
still, the anthropocentrist fallacy if we think all values lie in 
human options  and preferences. These plants and ani- 
mals do not make man the measure of things at all. 
Humans are not so much lighting up value in a merely 
potentially  valuable  world,  as they are  psychologically 
joining ongoing planetary natural  history in which there 
is value wherever there is positive creativity. While such 
creativity can  be present  in subjects with their interests 
and preferences, it can also be present objectively in liv- 
.   ing organisms  with  their  lives defended, and in species 
that defend an identity over time, and in systems that are 
self-organizing  and   that   project  storied  achievements. 
The valuing  human  subject  in an  otherwise  valueless 
world is an insufficient premise for the experienced con- 
clusions of those who value natural  history. 
Conversion to a biological and geological view seems 
truer  to world experience and more logically compelling. 
This too is a perspective, but ecologically  better 
informed; we know our place on a home planet, which is 
not only our home  but that for five or ten million other 
species. From  this  more  objective  viewpoint,  there  is 
something  subjective,  something  philosophically  naive, 
and even something hazardous in a time of ecological cri- 
sis, about  living in a reference frame where one species 
takes  itself as  absolute  and  values every thing  else  in 






1.   Callicott recognized this possibility from the start, 
despite his insistence that humans project all the value 
present in nature (1989, p. 26). 
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1.   What does Rolston mean by naturalizing value? How 
does he make a case for this thesis? 
2.   What is Rolston's objection to subjectivism in values, 
the idea that all values arise by sentient beings' valuing 
objects? In another place he calls this the refrigerator- 
light theory of values. The refrigerator light does not 
come on until someone opens the door. Similarly, the 
subjectivist says that values only come into existence 
when humans or conscious valuers value states of 
affairs. 
3.   Discuss the arguments for and against the thesis that 
nature has objective value—that is, it has value 
whether or not conscious beings value nature. 
